The Eurozone currently confronts severe short-run macroeconomic adjustment problems, and a deficient institutional architecture that has to be reformed in the longer run. Europe's efforts at economic and monetary union are historically unprecedented. However, the gold standard provides lessons regarding what will and what won't work, macroeconomically and politically, in the short run, while US history provides long-run lessons regarding appropriate institutional structures. The latter also suggests that institutional reform only happens at times of great crisis, and that it cannot be taken for granted. Eurozone leaders may therefore ultimately have to take heed of the lessons of history regarding currency union breakups.
The Eurozone is in trouble. Unemployment is at 12 percent and is getting worse. In Spain and Greece total unemployment exceeds 26 percent, and youth unemployment exceeds 60 percent. These two countries, together with Ireland and Portugal, and most recently Cyprus (subject to parliamentary approval which had not yet been received at the time of writing), are in official bailout programs. If Slovenia eventually joins the club, as seems possible, then more than a third of the Eurozone's members will be in such programs. There has been a sharp decline in citizens' confidence in European institutions, and in Greece the fascist Golden Dawn party entered parliament in 2012 and has since seen major gains in several opinion polls. Economies, societies, and political systems are fraying at the seams.
In the Cypriot, Irish, and Spanish cases banking crises rather than public finance have been to blame for economic collapse and loss of political sovereignty.
Pre-crisis cross-border flows of capital had pushed up wages, prices, and asset prices in recipient countries, implying major adjustment problems that now have to be faced, but the fact that many of these flows have been channeled through banks is what has led to some of the Eurozone's most intractable problems. The costs of dealing with banking crises has worsened governments' fiscal positions, which in turn has placed further strain on banks' balance sheets, leading to a further deterioration in governments' fiscal positions, and so on. what institutions the Eurozone will need in the longer run to survive, and, perhaps more pessimistically, the circumstances in which these are likely to come about, if they ever do. Finally, history also provides lessons relevant to the breakup of the Eurozone, should it come to that.
Why Previous "Monetary Unions" Offer a Poor Analogy
We agree with Eichengreen (2008) that the Euro is sui generis: there has never been anything quite like it before. In this section, we offer some comparisons and contrasts with previous arrangements that superficially appear somewhat similar.
The columns of Table 1 list of the arrangements we consider, including three "monetary unions," along with currency board arrangements, the U.S. common currency, and the gold standard. The rows of the column show various characteristics of these arrangements. (Schuler 1992) . The key requirements are that the issuer must freely exchange local for foreign currency at par, and must hold enough foreign-denominated safe assets to cover its entire monetary base liabilities.
Currency boards typically do not involve a common central bank or a common currency and countries can choose to leave at any time.
The U.S. actually has a true monetary union, not simply a more or less hard peg. As we will see, it gradually developed a common central bank, a banking union, and a fiscal union. The obvious difference between the U.S. and the Eurozone is that in the American case political union preceded monetary union, while the European gamble has been to try to develop a monetary union in the absence of political (and fiscal, and banking) union. Finally, the gold standard was not even formally speaking an exchange rate agreement. Rather, it was a series of country-by-country monetary regimes linking the value of currencies to the price of gold, obliging central banks or their equivalents to hold sufficient reserves to be able to make this commitment credible. It only became a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime as a by-product of free trade in gold, which led to gold prices being almost, but not entirely (since arbitrage was costly), equalized in different countries. Countries retained their own currencies, central banks and political and financial sovereignty, and could sever the link between their currencies and gold whenever they wished.
In short, there are no good historical analogies with European monetary union. However, this does not mean that history holds no lessons for the Eurozone.
The Adjustment Problem: What We Can Learn from the Gold Standard
Most of the debate in the run-up to the adoption of the Euro was couched in terms of traditional optimal currency area theory (Mundell 1961 , Kenen 1969 Under the gold standard, the key goal for policy makers was not to moderate booms and busts, but rather to avoid losing gold. When a country found itself with a balance of payments deficit (that is, a current account surplus insufficient to finance capital outflows, or borrowing insufficient to finance a current account deficit), it needed a mechanism to staunch the resulting outflow of gold, and eventually to reverse it. Such a mechanism involved among other things lowering the prices of domestic goods relative to those of foreign goods (depreciating the real exchange rate), thus improving the trade balance. Such "real depreciation" can be achieved by depreciating the nominal exchange rate, i.e., lowering the value of the currency in which domestic prices are expressed, but this was ruled out under the gold standard. Real depreciation thus had to be achieved by lowering the domestic price level, a strategy sometimes referred to as "internal devaluation" in the Eurozone context.
In David Hume's (1752) formulation of the "price-specie-flow mechanism," adjustment was supposed to be automatic. Hume argued that gold outflows, which were needed to pay for trade deficits, would lower the money supply, since the latter was tied to gold reserves. This in turn would lower the internal price level, depreciate the real exchange rate, and improve the trade balance. Conversely, surplus countries would experience gold inflows, inflation, and real exchange rate appreciation.
The late 19 th century world was more complicated than this. Enormous One reason for this was that key economies such as Britain did not suffer from severe balance of payment imbalances, so not much adjustment was needed. In turn, Britain's payments remained fairly well balanced because the pound sterling's role as a "vehicle currency" facilitating international transactions meant that longterm capital outflows were in part matched by short term capital inflows, as borrowers placed money on deposit in Britain; and they were in part matched by exports of British capital goods (Eichengreen 1992 (Eichengreen , 2008 ).
In addition, pre-1914 economic and political conditions meant that insofar as macroeconomic adjustment was needed, it was easier than it would become in the interwar period (or in the Eurozone today).
First, wages and prices were more flexible than they would become subsequently: Hanes and James ( Fourth, partly as a result of limited political pressure opposing the gold standard, and also given ample gold reserves that were spread out among the core countries, capital markets usually did not question the commitment of policymakers to the gold standard. Credibility implied that capital flows tended to be stabilizing: that is, if an exchange rate started depreciating, it was expected that it would soon appreciate, meaning that private investors would buy the currencythus helping to bring about the needed appreciation and in the process reversing gold outflows (Eichengreen, 1992) .
Fifth, when these mechanisms did not suffice, international cooperation between core central banks willing to lend to each other, or intervene together, could be relied upon to stabilize the situation. In other cases, the value of gold across countries was allowed to vary within a certain band (between the "gold points"), or kept at the band edge via quasi-controls ("gold devices") without apparently setting off fears that monetary authorities might be contemplating a long-term deviation from the official pegged exchange rate.
It was a different story for countries in southern and eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. There, some countries pegged to silver, others had inconvertible currencies, and still others tried to peg to gold with only sporadic success. Catão and Solomou (2005) point out that trade with these countries amounted to two-thirds of core European trade, and more than 40 percent of US trade: that their exchange rates fluctuated against gold is not just an incidental detail, but an important fact about the world economy of this period. Catão and Solomou find evidence of large nominal and real depreciations in peripheral economies vis à vis the core during time of crisis, such as the late 1870s and early 1890s, and also find that trade balances improved when real exchange rates depreciated.
Summing up, adjustment under the classical gold standard was supposed in principle to involve "internal devaluation" only. Such a strategy was probably easier before World War I, in both economic and political terms, than it would be during the interwar period. Nevertheless, in the core economies adjustment typically happened in other ways, and only limited adjustment was required in the first place.
In the periphery, where more adjustment was required at times of stress in the international economy, and which did not benefit from the same international cooperation which core economies enjoyed, countries frequently adjusted via nominal depreciation. Even in the heyday of the gold standard, the "internal devaluation" strategy was nowhere near as ubiquitous as is often thought.
The Gold Standard and the Great Depression
The economic and political environment was very different after World War I, implying that the gold standard worked much less smoothly than it had done before (Kindleberger 1973; Temin 1989; Eichengreen 1992) .
First, the underlying imbalances facing core economies and requiring adjustment became much larger than previously. The United Kingdom's balance of payments position was much more fragile. Her net international asset position had been greatly weakened by the war, implying less investment income, while war debts were another drain on the economy. Her trade position had been weakened as a result of competitors seizing overseas markets during the war. In addition, on
Churchill's decision, the pound went back onto the gold standard at the pre-war rate 
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Note: the wage data are adjusted for working days; no seasonal adjustment in the case of Ireland.
1 Constant nominal wages are consistent with falling unit labor costs if labor productivity increases. On this score, Ireland does better, but the effect is partly a statistical illusion due to a shift in the composition of the Irish workforce, with low-productivity workers being laid off (Darvas 2012). The Irish real exchange rate depreciated during the period, but this was due to keeping a lid on wage costs while wages rose elsewhere, not by depressing local nominal wages. The experience of the 1930s is not only a cautionary tale of the limitations of adjustment strategies based on internal devaluation and fiscal austerity, but an illustration of the power of monetary policy and of the value of macroeconomic policy flexibility. It is a useful reminder that Keynes' short run is the time frame within which politics occurs, for good or ill.
The Fiscal and Banking Nexus: Lessons from the United States
The United States differs from the actually existing Eurozone in several critical details of its economic, financial, and political architecture, as discussed earlier, and these qualitative differences have accumulated over time (Rockoff 2000; Bordo 2004) . Figure 2 indicates the extent to which the U.S. is also more likely to satisfy the Mundell-style optimal currency area criteria regarding the integration of product markets, symmetry of shocks, and labor mobility, as well as Kenen's criterion regarding the ability of a central fiscal authority to smooth shocks across regions. The "desired" policy-rate gaps between the Eurozone and its core and periphery regions are much larger and more persistent. Prior to the crisis the periphery target was consistently 300 basis points above the core; afterwards it was between 500 and 700 basis points lower. By this metric, a one-size-fits-all monetary policy appears more tenable in the U.S. than in the Eurozone. For a long period, until the U.S. Civil War, bank notes in the United Statesthat is, promissory notes issued by banks that could be used to transfer funds or to make payments-did not uniformly trade at par with currency (Gorton 2012). Even after this, bank deposits did always not trade at par with currency: that is, if you deposited currency in a bank account, and later withdrew it, the amounts might not match. "Free banking" was mostly the norm, there was no monetary authority, and in this decentralized system only gold functioned as a reference value for money, or as true (par) money itself.
Yet payments frictions were in some respects the least of U.S. problems.
Throughout this time, the U.S. economy suffered asymmetric shocks at the regional level which states felt they couldn't or didn't want to offset given fiscal orthodoxies, and which centralized monetary policy, such as it was, was designed to ignore Treasury debt on bank balance sheets but not just as a wartime expedient, and it remains there to this day as the U.S. banking system's reference safe and liquid
asset. Yet no central bank or lender of last resort appeared yet, and pockets of "nonpar" banking survived, especially in rural areas. Bank runs and crises remained, and recessions recurred frequently, but in a political-economic equilibrium where macroeconomic management was not expected to play a role.
Still, by the time in the early twentieth century that U.S. banks had become large enough that they constituted systemic risks, they were holding U.S. Account. Today's Eurozone equivalent is the TARGET2 balances between the separate national central banks and the ECB. In both the U.S. (1.9%) and the Eurozone (2.6%) these imbalances represent a small fraction of banking system assets (but a much larger share of Eurozone GDP, 9.4% versus 1.7% of GDP); but in the U.S. since the 1930s there has been absolutely no concern that these imbalances might be limited or subject to settlement (or exit) risk. 3 The financial collapse of the 1930s was utterly devastating, revealing the more destructive potential of such crises in modern, highly-financialized economies where levered balance sheets imply "financial acceleration": in good time banks, firms and households might feed off wealth effects, borrow and drive up asset prices after positive shocks, and create more wealth and leverage; but after negative shocks this could go into reverse, producing a vicious circle of contraction Thus, after 100 years of evolution, the U.S. fiscal and banking union involves an interesting and, so far, durable mix of hard long-run rules, such as the "no bailout" setup allowing state default, and institutional innovations that have made the system more stable. Since the Civil War the system has not involved a state-level financial doom loop; since the Depression it has provided an elastic short-run policy regime, embedded in intra-union fiscal stabilizers and union-level banking sector backstop and oversight. In contrast, since the current crisis began the Eurozone has been unable to decide on whether there should be bailouts or not, defaults or not, automatic stabilizers or not, bank backstops and oversight or not-indeed at times it has veered towards almost all of these positions.
With U.S. history in mind, an optimist might argue since the Eurozone project is barely 10 years old, and the United States took perhaps 140 years to fully develop an appropriate institutional structure, we should be impressed rather than concerned by how far the Eurozone has come already. The evolution of U.S. Europe's fitful progress on meaningful banking or fiscal union reforms suggests that the jury is still out on whether the Eurozone can achieve the minimal necessary collective institutions needed to sustain deep integration and macrofinancial stability of the kind that the U.S. economy can take for granted. What might these institutions be?
The fact that the Eurozone scores so poorly on optimal currency area grounds suggests a need for mechanisms allowing smoother and more symmetric adjustment between its members. Moves to enhance labor mobility, for example by improving pension or health insurance portability, can help, but, we suspect, only to a limited extent. A stronger fiscal center as in the U.S. is therefore desirable, but there seems little prospect of this: member states will thus have to engage in counter-cyclical fiscal policy themselves. For some countries, the size of their existing debts means that debt restructuring will be required in order for them to regain the ability to do this (Wyplosz 2012). The difficulty of developing Eurozonewide automatic stabilizers should also focus attention on the design and policies of the ECB. Since asymmetric adjustment based on internal devaluation does not work, the ECB should target a higher rate of inflation for the Eurozone as a whole at times of stress, to facilitate relative price adjustment. The behavior of the ECB during this crisis suggests that treaty revisions may be required to bring about such a shift in policy.
The institutional architecture of the Eurozone also needs to be deepened if a recurrence of the present crisis is to be avoided. A banking union seems essential.
This would involve common supervision, common resolution procedures and common deposit insurance, and in consequence at least some elements of a fiscal union (Pisani-Ferry et al. 2012; Goyal et al. 2013 [IMF] ). However, the system will remain fragile as long as national banks hold national debt: a "safe" Eurozone asset is required so that governments can default on their debts without collateral damage to financial systems in their own countries and potentially, via contagion, across the Eurozone (Brunnermeier et al. 2011) . Say something more about this?
Such a safe asset is particularly important since the ability of national governments to default is also essential, being the logical corollary of the no-bailout clause which has worked well in the U.S. context, and which seems consistent with the requirements of national democracies. By contrast, the Eurozone attempt to 
Costs of Exit: Lessons from Past Breakups
What if the Eurozone ultimately fails? History can speak of past cases in which common currencies split up, although again the analogies are imperfect. In one way, this process proved straightforward: countries typically overstamped existing banknotes, and converted bank deposits into the new currency at a pre-arranged parity, imposing levies or forced loans in the process as needed. However, Garber and Spencer (1994) note a feature of the process with obvious implications for any Eurozone break-up: the fact that these measures were enacted at different times in different countries led to large flows of currency across borders, despite attempts by the authorities to block them, as people sought to move their currency holdings to wherever they thought they would be most valuable. These decisions were based partly on assumptions about where the conversion would take place at the most favorable rate, and partly on assumptions about future rates of inflation; the old currency also tended to flow to where it remained legal tender the longest (in this instance Hungary). The obvious implication is that any break-up of the Eurozone would work best if it happened quickly, and preferably in a coordinated manner, with temporary capital controls being essential. Another implication is that any suggestion of a future break-up could prove extremely destabilizing as investors and households anticipated the capital gains and losses that it would imply (Eichengreen 2007).
Austro-Hungarian Empire
The Austro-Hungarian example does not suggest that hyperinflation is a necessary consequence of a currency break-up, as is sometimes suggested: the hyperinflation experienced in both Austria and Hungary reflected the inflationary financing of large budget deficits that had helped precipitate the break-up of monetary union in the first place. Czechoslovakia put in place an institutional framework prohibiting such policies, and suffered deflation rather than inflation, as it attempted to rejoin the gold standard at the pre-war parity (Eichengreen, 2007) .
Argentine Currency Board
Argentina has exited currency board experiments three times, in 1914, 1929, and 2002 . The most recent exit illustrates some problems that could occur in the event of a Eurozone breakup. Argentina had borrowed large amounts from local banks. When the government defaulted, the banks became insolvent as well, leading to a textbook "triple crisis"-a banking crisis, a sovereign debt crisis, and a currency crash. In the aftermath came the problem of who bore the losses. In 2002, Argentina declared that dollar loans would be repaid in pesos. This reduced the cost to the government of bailing out Argentina's banks (Roubini and Setser), but also led to a plethora of costly legal disputes. These included disputes about "pesification" itself, and about the asymmetric pesification values attached to different claims; they dragged on for many years, generating considerable uncertainty. The external default led to an eventual bond exchange which minority "vulture" holdouts were still fighting in New York courts at the time of writing. Capital controls (corralito)
had to be imposed immediately to prevent arbitrage and have never been fully dismantled. There were thus considerable costly side effects which have to be set against the benefits to Argentina of devaluation and default.
Conclusions
In the long run, a well-functioning Eurozone requires a move towards a banking union, and at least some degree of fiscal union. The problem is that the short-run problems facing the periphery are now so great that politicians may never get a chance to solve these long-run problems, since the Eurozone will have collapsed in the meantime. The history of the gold standard tells us that an asymmetric adjustment process involving internal devaluation in debtor countries, with no corresponding inflation in the core, is unlikely to be economically or politically sustainable. A more flexible macroeconomic policy mix, involving looser monetary policy, a higher inflation rate, a weaker euro, debt restructuring, and greater levels of public expenditure by core governments (or some EU-level institution such as the European Investment Bank) is needed in order to make the adjustment process less asymmetrical, and lessen the risk of a Eurozone collapse.
Turning to the long-run challenges facing the Eurozone, U.S. experience suggests that major institutional reforms require major political and economic crises. Moves towards an American banking union, and a larger Federal government capable of playing an adjustment role in regional crises, only came about after such shocks as the Civil War, the Panic of 1907, and the Great Depression. The trouble is that these crises occurred within the context of a pre-existing state. It is one thing to develop deeper Federal institutions at times of crisis in one country; another thing to do so in a union of 17 independent states. There, a sufficiently major crisis may lead to countries deciding to abandon the Euro project altogether, which is why a Eurozone breakup cannot be excluded. 
